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Abstract
This paper treats the privacy-preserving publication of social graphs in the
presence of active adversaries, that is, adversaries with the ability to introduce
sybil nodes in the graph prior to publication and leverage them to create unique
fingerprints for a set of victim nodes and re-identify them after publication.
Stemming from the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity, we introduce (k, ℓ)-anonymous
transformations, characterising graph perturbation methods that ensure pro-
tection from active adversaries levaraging up to ℓ sybil nodes. Additionally, we
introduce a new privacy property: (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, which relaxes
the assumption made by (k, ℓ)-anonymity that adversaries can control all dis-
tances between sybil nodes and the rest of the nodes in the graph. The new
privacy property is in turn the basis for a new type of graph perturbation:
(k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations. We propose algorithms for ob-
taining (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformations for arbitrary values of k,
as well as (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations for small values of ℓ.
Keywords: social graphs, privacy-preserving publication, active adversaries, perturba-
tion methods.
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) have become the most successful application of our
time. Nearly two billion persons1 regularly use some OSN to interact with friends and
relatives, share information, get news, entertainment, etc. As a result of this, massive
1Source: statista.com, consulted on April 21st, 2017.
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amounts of information about human behaviour, personal relationships, consumption
patters, personal preferences, and more, are generated everyday. An important part
of this information is encoded in the form of social graphs. In a social graph, every
vertex corresponds to a person (a user of the OSN), whereas edges represent relations
between individuals. Rich personal information, such as name, address, etc. is usually
associated to vertices as attributes. Edges can also have associated attributes, which
may encode, for instance, the nature of the relation (friendship, laboral, family), the
date and place where it was established, etc.
This massive amount of information is enormously valuable. OSNs themselves
analyse this data in order to determine the advertisement they show to their users,
suggest new potential friends, filter out the information that they consider not to
be interesting to the user, etc. As holders of the information, the OSN can effec-
tively access the totality of the available data, as authorised by the users when they
upload their information. However, third parties, such as social scientists, market re-
searchers, public institutions and private companies, are also interested in accessing
and analysing a part of this information for conducting population studies, assessing
the effect of communication campaigns, surveying public opinion, and many other
purposes. In order to enable these studies, it is necessary that the OSN adminis-
trators release samples of their social graphs. However, despite the usefulness of the
studies that can be conducted on the released data, the sensitive nature of a part of
the information encoded in social graphs, e.g. political or religious affiliation, arises
serious privacy concerns.
A na¨ıve approach to protect the privacy of users in publishing social graphs is to
remove all personally identifiable information from the released graph. However, as
shown in [6], even a graph with no identifying attributes can leak sensitive informa-
tion, since some structural properties (the degree of vertices, their neighbourhoods,
etc.) can be unique to certain users. A re-identification attack seeks to leverage some
knowledge about a set of users, the victims, to re-identify them after the graph is re-
leased. For example, an adversary who knows the number of friends of all the victim
vertices can later re-identify them in the released graph if every value happens to be
unique, even if all vertex and edge attributes have been removed. Once a set of users
is re-identified, the attacker can learn sensitive information, such as the existence of
relations between two users or the (co-)affiliation of some of them to a community.
According to the means by which adversaries obtain the knowledge used to re-
identify the victims, they are classified as passive or active [1]. Passive adversaries rely
on information obtainable from publicly available sources, such as other OSNs, but do
not attempt to purposely alter the structure of the network. On the other hand, active
adversaries enroll sybil nodes in the network and try to force the creation of structural
patterns that allow them to later re-identify the victims. Several active attacks were
described in [1, 7, 8]. In every attack, the adversary inserts a small number of sybil
nodes, and then creates unique connection patters, referred to as fingerprints, between
sybil nodes and the victims. Additionally, the connections between pairs of sybil nodes
are established in such a way that the subgraph induced by them is not isomorphic
(with high probability) to any other subgraph. Once the graph is published, the
uniquely identifiable set of sybil nodes is retrived, and the unique fingerprints allow
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to re-identify the victims.
The notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity was introduced in [11] as a measure of the resistance
of a social graph to active attacks. Informally, a (k, ℓ)-anonymous graph ensures that
an adversary with the ability to insert up to ℓ sybil nodes in the network, cannot use
the distances from these sybil nodes to other vertices to uniquely identify any vertex.
This guarantee comes from the fact that each vertex is ensured to be undistinguishable
from at least other k − 1 vertices according to the so-called metric representation
with respect to every vertex subset of size at most ℓ. Then, a family of methods that
transform a (1, 1)-anonymous graph G (which is the least private type of graphs) into
a graph G′ that satsifies (k, ℓ)-anonymity for k > 1 or ℓ > 1, was proposed in [5, 4].
In this paper, we re-visit the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity. We focus on two as-
sumptions encoded in (k, ℓ)-anonymity: treating every vertex subset of size up to ℓ
as a potential set of sybil nodes, and assuming that the adversary is able to control
the distances between the set of sybil nodes and every other vertex in the graph,
which is not realistic. As a result, we first propose the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymous
transformations, which ensure the same level of protection that would be achieved by
enforcing (k, ℓ)-anonymity while performing less modifications in the graph. Then,
we introduce a new privacy property, (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, which relaxes the
assumption on the distances that the adversary is able to control. Finally, these two
ideas are combined in the notion of (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation, and
we propose two methods, based on edge additions and removals, for performing (k, 1)-
and (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our
new adversary model, introducing (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, (k, ℓ)-adjacency
anonymity, and (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations. Section 3 introduces the
algorithm for obtaining (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformations, whereas Sect-
ion 4 introduces the algorithm for obtaining (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transfor-
mations. Finally, we discuss our results and possible directions for future work in
Section 5. Before proceeding, we will introduce some notation that will be used
throughout the paper. We will use the notation u ∼G v for two vertices u, v ∈ V (G)
that are adjacent in G, i.e. (u, v) ∈ E(G). The open neighbourhood of a vertex
u ∈ V (G), denoted by NG(u), is the set NG(u) = {v : u ∼G v}, whereas the closed
neighbourhood of u in G is the set NG[u] = {u}∪NG(u). Similarly, for a set S ⊂ V (G),
we define NG(S) = ∪v∈SNG(v)\S and NG[S] = ∪v∈SNG[v]. The degree of a vertex u,
denoted by δG(u), is its number of neighbours, i.e. δG(u) = |NG(u)|. In a graph G of
order n, we will refer to vertices of degree 0, 1 and n− 1 as isolated, end- and domi-
nant vertices, respectively. The distance between two vertices u and v in G, denoted
as dG(u, v), is the number of edges in a shortest path joining u and v. For a graph
G = (V,E) and a subset S of vertices of G, we will denote by 〈S〉G the subgraph of
G induced by S, that is 〈S〉G = (S,E ∩ S × S). In the previously defined notations,
if there is no ambiguity, we will drop the graph-specific subindices and simply write
u ∼ v, N(u), δ(u), etc. For a graph G, we define δ(G) = minv∈V (G){δG(v)} and
∆(G) = maxv∈V (G){δG(v)} and, as usual, we will denote by Kn and Nn the complete
and empty graphs of order n, respectively.
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Figure 1: The four stages of an active attack.
2 Adversary model
An active adversary uses graph properties of a set of sybil nodes to re-identify users in
an anonymised social graph. Prior publication of the social network graph, the active
attacker adds a set of sybil nodes to the network (e.g. nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 1a).
The sybil nodes establish links between themselves and also with the victims (e.g.
users H and G in Figure 1a). After publication of the social network graph without
the users’ identifiers, the attacker first searches for the subgraph formed by the sybil
nodes. Victims connected to the attacker subgraph can be reidentified by using the
neighbour relation between sybil nodes and victims. For example, the non-sybil nodes
connected to 1 and 4 in Figure 1b, respectively, must be H and G. This allows the
adversary to acquire knowledge that was supposed to remain private, such as the
existence of a link between users H and G.
From a practical point of view, active attacks require the ability to insert sybil
nodes in the social network and remain unnoticed by sybil detection techniques. This
is a fairly easy task in today’s social networks, as false positives in sybil detection
are undesirable and registration to the network should be trivial; social networks
understandably favour usability and user experience over sybil detection. From a
theoretical point of view, an active attack relies on creating a unique attacker sub-
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graph. That is to say, the induced subgraph formed by the sybil nodes should have
no trivial automorphism and no other subgraph in the network isomorphic to it. For
example, assume that the adversary in the attack in Figure 1 could not insert the
third node, i.e. the node labelled 3. This makes the subgraph induced by 1, 2 and
4 isomorphic to the subgraph induced by B, C, and H , which prevents the attacker
from correctly retrieving the inserted subgraph.
Backstrom et al. already showed that, despite of the previously mentioned chal-
lenges, active attacks can be implemented successfully [1]. They proved that only
log n sybil nodes, where n is the number of vertices of the network, are needed to
create an attacker subgraph which is unique with high probability. That makes active
attacks particularly dangerous and hard to prevent.
Effectively determining whether a social graph is vulnerable to an active attack
is a necessary step towards developing a mitigation strategy against it. For example,
the complete graph G satisfies that for every proper subgraph S there exists another
subgraph S ′ that is isomorphic to S. Such property makes an active attack unfeasible
in a complete graph. Determining the actual resistance of an arbitrary graph to active
attacks is not trivial, though. A first step on this direction was given in [11], where
Trujillo-Rasua and Yero introduced the privacy measure (k, ℓ)-anonymity.
Consider a total order  on the vertices of a graph G. Given a set S ⊆ V (G),
let (v1, v2, . . . , vt), where vi ∈ S for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, be the vector composed by the
elements of S, in such a way that v1  v2  . . .  vt. For the sake of simplicity in
our presentation, in what follows we will abuse notation and refer to the ordered set
S = {v1, v2, . . . , vt}. Given an ordered set of sybil nodes S = (s1, . . . , st) in a graph
G = (V,E), Trujillo-Rasua and Yero [11] define the adversary knowledge about a
user u ∈ V as the vector (dG(v, s1), . . . , dG(v, st)). This vector is referred to as metric
representation of u with respect to S, and denoted rG(u|S) [10, 2].
The metric representation was introduced in [10, 2] as a tool to define the so-
called resolving sets. A set S ⊂ V (G) is said to be a resolving set2 of G if every
vertex u ∈ V (G) has a unique metric representation with respect to S. This property
of resolving sets inspired the definition in [11] of an opposed concept, with implications
in vertex privacy.
Definition 1 (k-antiresolving set). Let G = (V,E) be a non-trivial graph. A set
S ⊂ V is a k-antiresolving set of G if k is the largest positive integer such that,
for every v ∈ V (G) \ S, there exist vertices w1, w2, . . . , wk−1 ∈ V (G) \ S such that
v, w1, w2, . . . , wk−1 are pairwise different and
rG(v | S) = rG(w1 | S) = rG(w2 | S) = . . . = rG(wk−1 | S).
The minimum cardinality of a k-antiresolving set of a graph G is called the k-
metric antidimension of G. These concepts were used to quantify the privacy of a
social graph in the presence of active attackers as follows.
2Multiple terminologies have been used for resolving sets in the literature. The term resolving set
was introduced by Slater in [10], whereas Harary and Melter [2] introduced the terminology locating
set and Sebo˝ and Tannier [9] preferred the term metric generator.
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Definition 2 ((k, ℓ)-anonymity). A graph G is said to satisfy (k, ℓ)-anonymity if k
is the smallest positive integer such that the k-metric antidimension of G is smaller
than or equal to ℓ.
From a privacy perspective, if a graph satisfies (k, ℓ)-anonymity, an attacker with
the capacity to enrol, and successfully retrieve, up to ℓ sybil nodes in the graph would
still be incapable of distinguishing any vertex from at least other k−1 vertices. Taking
back again the example of the complete graph Kn, it is easy to prove that Kn satisfies
(n− l, l)-anonymity. It is worth noticing that k = n− l corresponds to the maximum
value possible for k in (k, ℓ)-anonymity given ℓ = l.
Certainly, a graph satisfying (k, ℓ)-anonymity for k > 1 effectively resists active
attacks when performed by at most ℓ sybil nodes. However, event the simplest of the
privacy goals, namely transforming a (1, 1)-anonymous graph into a (k, ℓ)-anonymous
graph G′ with either k > 1 or ℓ > 1, has not been accomplished without significant
information loss [5]. Our observation is that (k, ℓ)-anonymity, although suitable to
quantify resistance against active attacks, cannot be applied straightforwardly to
privacy-preserving transformation of social graphs.
2.1 Revisiting (k, ℓ)-anonymity
(k, ℓ)-anonymity quantifies over all subsets of vertices of size at most ℓ. Therefore,
a transformation from an original graph G to an anonymized graph G′ satisfying,
for example (2, ℓ)-anonymity, must ensure that every subset of vertices S in G′ with
|S| ≤ ℓ is a k′-antiresolving set where k′ ≥ 2, regardless of whether S was indeed a
1-antiresolving set in G or not. In effect, assuming that the set of attacker nodes S is
already a 2-antiresolving set in the original graph G, it is harmless to publish (with
respect to (2, |S|)-anonymity ) a transformation of G where S is a 1-antiresolving set.
Consequently, when aiming at (2, ℓ)-anonymity, a transformation method should only
be concerned about those 1-antiresolving sets with size at most ℓ. We formalise this
concept as follows.
Definition 3 ((k, ℓ)-anonymous transformation). A pair (G1, G2) is a (k, ℓ)-ano-
nymous transformation if for every subset S ⊆ V (G1) ∩ V (G2) with |S| ≤ ℓ, S being
a k1-antiresolving set in G1, and S being k2-antiresolving set in G2, it holds that
k1 < k =⇒ k2 ≥ k.
Notice that, in particular, if a graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-anonymity, then every pair
(G0, G), where G0 is an arbitrary graph, is a (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformation. The
converse is not true, as exemplified in Figure 2.
2.2 The adversary knowledge
Privacy measures based on k-anonymity are defined based on a concrete definition
of the adversary knowledge. In (k, ℓ)-anonymity, an adversary is a set of sybil nodes
S ⊆ V (G) within a network G. The knowledge of such adversary about a user
u ∈ V (G)− S is considered to be the metric representation rG(u|S). That is to say,
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Figure 2: Two (2, 1)-anonymous transformations (G1, G2) and (G1, G3). The graph
G2 satisfies (2, 1)-anonymity, whereas G3 does not.
the adversary is capable of determining the distance from every attacker node to any
other node in the network. This is a strong assumption, yet it can be justified by the
necessity of not underestimating the adversary capabilities.
In this article we relax the assumption on the adversary knowledge made in [11].
Our decision is based on the fact that all active attacks proposed so far [1, 7, 8] rely
on the neighbour relation between the attacker nodes and the victims. It is indeed
unrealistic to expect the adversary to rely on arbitrary distances, since that would
imply knowing the entire adjacency matrix and, especially, having the capability to
influence whether a relation is established, or not, between any pair of users of the
network.
In a manner analogous to the definition of antiresolving sets, we use standard
concepts from Graph theory to represent an adversary that only has knowledge about
its neighbours. The concept is known as adjacency representation, introduced by
Jannesari and Omoomi [3] and defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Adjacency representation). Given a graph G = (V,E), an ordered set
S = {s1, . . . , st} ⊂ V , and a vertex u ∈ V , the adjacency metric representation of
u with respect S is the vector aG(r|S) = (aG(s1, v), . . . , aG(st, v)) where aG : V (G)×
V (G)→ N is defined by:
aG(u, v) =


0 if u = v
1 if u ∼
G
v
2 otherwise
(1)
Note that aG(u, v) = min{2, dG(u, v)} for every u, v ∈ V (G). Now, we will adapt
the notion of k-antiresolving sets in order to account for the new type of adversary.
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Definition 5 (k-adjacency antiresolving set). Let G = (V,E) be a non-trivial graph.
A set S ⊂ V is a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G if k is the largest positive integer
such that, for every v ∈ V (G) \ S, there exist vertices w1, w2, . . . , wk−1 such that
v, w1, w2, . . . , wk−1 are pairwise different and
aG(v | S) = aG(w1 | S) = aG(w2 | S) = . . . = aG(wk−1 | S).
To illustrate the difference between k-adjacency antiresolving sets and k-antiresolv-
ing sets, consider the graph G depicted in Figure 3. The set {v} is a 2-antiresolving
set of G, as z1 and z2 satisfy d(v, z1) = d(v, z2) = 3, whereas d(v, x1) = d(v, x2) =
d(v, x3) = d(v, x4) = 1 and d(v, y1) = d(v, y2) = d(v, y3) = d(v, y4) = 2. On the
other hand, we have that aG(x1, {v}) = aG(x2, {v}) = aG(x3, {v}) = aG(x4, {v}) =
(1), while aG(y1, {v}) = aG(y2, {v}) = aG(y3, {v}) = aG(y4, {v}) = aG(z1, {v}) =
aG(z2, {v}) = (2), so {v} is a 4-adjacency antiresolving set of G.
x4y4
z1
y1 x1 x2 y2
z2
y3x3
v
Figure 3: In this graph, the set {v} is a 2-antiresolving set and a 4-adjacency antire-
solving set.
For a graph G = (V,E) and a set S ⊂ V , let RG,S be the equivalence relation
such that two vertices u and v satisfy u RG,S v if and only if u, v ∈ V \ S and
aG(u | S) = aG(v | S). Moreover, we will use the notation AG,S for the set of
equivalence classes induced in V \ S by the relation RG,S. It is simple to see that S
is a (minA∈AG,S{|A|})-adjacency antiresolving set of G.
2.3 Problem statement
We will first enunciate the notions of (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity and (k, ℓ)-adjacency
anonymous transformation, which restrict the original definitions of (k, ℓ)-anonymity
and (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformation, to account for adversaries whose knowledge
consists of the adjacency representations of their victims.
Definition 6 (k-adjacency antidimension). The k-adjacency antidimension of a graph
G is the minimum cardinality of a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G.
Definition 7 ((k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity). A graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-adjacency ano-
nymity if k is the smallest positive integer such that the k-adjacency antidimension
of G is smaller than or equal to ℓ.
According to Definition 7, if a graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, then
for every S ⊂ V (G) of size at most ℓ and every u ∈ V (G)\S there exist v1, . . . , vk−1 ∈
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V (G) \ (S ∪ {u}) such that u, v1, . . . , vk−1 are pairwise different and aG(u | S) =
aG(v1 | S) = . . . = aG(vk−1 | S), so the probability of S being able to re-identify v is
at most 1/k.
It is simple to see that the complete graph Kn and the empty graph Nn = (V, ∅)
satisfy (n − ℓ, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity for every ℓ ∈ {1, n − 1}, because for every
S ⊂ V the adjacency representation of every other vertex with respect to S is either
(1, 1, . . . , 1) or (2, 2, . . . , 2), respectively. In the next sections we will introduce results
characterising the graphs that satisfy (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity for other values of
k and ℓ.
Definition 8 ((k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation). A pair (G1, G2) is a
(k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation if for every subset S ⊆ V (G1) ∩ V (G2)
with |S| ≤ ℓ, S being a k1-adjacency antiresolving set in G1, and S being k2-adjacency
antiresolving set in G2, it holds that k1 < k =⇒ k2 ≥ k.
In a manner analogous to (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, we have that if a
graph G satisfies (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymity, then every pair (G0, G), where G0 is an
arbitrary graph, is a (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformation.
Definition 9 (Problem statement). Let loss(G,G′) be a cost function providing
the information loss incurred by the graph transformation from G to G′. Given a
graph G, and natural numbers k and ℓ, find G′ such that (G,G′) is a (k, ℓ)-adjacency
anonymous transformation and loss(G,G′) is minimum.
3 (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformations
Consider a (k0, 1)-adjacency anonymous graph G of order n. In order to increase the
resistance of G to active attackers leveraging one sybil node, our interest is to propose
(k, 1)-adjacency transformations of the form (G,G′) where k > k0. The next result
allows us to assess the values of k that may be of interest.
Proposition 10. Let G be a non-complete, non-empty graph of order n satisfying
(k, 1)-adjacency anonymity. Then, k ≤
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be a non-complete, non-empty graph of order n satisfying
(k, 1)-adjacency anonymity. Suppose, for the purpose of contradiction, that k >⌊
n−1
2
⌋
. Let v ∈ V be a vertex of G satisfying δ(v) /∈ {0, n − 1}. The existence of
such a vertex is guaranteed by the fact that the graph is not complete nor empty. We
have that AG,{v} = {NG(v), V \NG[v]}. If δ(v) ≤
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, then {v} is a k′-adjacency
antiresolving set of G with k′ < k, which is a contradiction. On the other hand,
if δ(v) >
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, then |V \ NG[v]| ≤
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, which again means that {v} is a k′-
adjacency antiresolving set of G with k′ < k, a contradiction. Therefore, we have
that k ≤
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
.
According to Proposition 10, in order to enforce (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity on
G for some k >
⌊
n−1
2
⌋
, it is necessary to transform G into a complete or empty
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graph, which lacks interest for us because such a graph would be completely useless
for analysis. Thus, we will focus on the values of k in the interval
[
k0 + 1,
⌊
n−1
2
⌋]
.
The following results show the relations between the minimum and maximum
degrees of a graph and its resistance against active attackers leveraging one sybil
node. We first introduce some additional notation. For a graph G = (V,E), let
IG = {v ∈ V : δ(v) = 0} be the set of isolated vertices and let DG = {v ∈ V :
δ(v) = n − 1} be the set of dominant vertices. Clearly, either IG = DG = ∅, or
IG = ∅ ∧ DG 6= ∅, or IG 6= ∅ ∧DG = ∅. With these definitions in mind, we give the
following three results.
Proposition 11. Every non-complete graph G n such that IG = ∅ satisfies (k, 1)-
adjacency anonymity with k = min {δ(G), n−∆(G)− 1}.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be a graph of order n without isolated or dominant vertices.
Consider a vertex v ∈ V . Clearly, AG,{v} = {NG(v), V \ NG[v]}, so the set {v} is a
(min{δ(v), n− δ(v)−1})-adjacency antiresolving set of G. In consequence, the graph
G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
k = min
v∈V
{min {δ(v), n− δ(v)− 1}}
= min
{
min
v∈V
{δ(v), n− δ(v)− 1}
}
= min
{
min
v∈V
{δ(v)} ,min
v∈V
{n− δ(v)− 1}
}
= min {δ(G), n−∆(G)− 1}
Proposition 12. Let G = (V,E) be a non-complete graph of order n such that
DG 6= ∅ and let S = V \DG. Then, G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
k = min {δ(G), |S| −∆(〈S〉G)− 1} .
Proof. We follow a reasoning analogous to that of the proof of Proposition 11. First,
consider a vertex v ∈ DG. We have that AG,{v} = {V \ {v}}. Now, consider a
vertex v ∈ S. In this case, AG,{v} = {NG(v), V \NG[v]} = {NG(v), S \N〈S〉G [v]}. In
consequence, we have that G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
k = min
{
n− 1,min
v∈S
{
min
{
δG(v), |S| − δ〈S〉G(v)− 1
}}}
= min
v∈S
{
min
{
δG(v), |S| − δ〈S〉G(v)− 1
}}
= min
{
min
v∈S
{
δG(v), |S| − δ〈S〉G(v)− 1
}}
= min
{
min
v∈S
{δG(v)} ,min
v∈S
{
|S| − δ〈S〉G(v)− 1
}}
= min {δ(G), |S| −∆(〈S〉G)− 1}
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Proposition 13. Let G = (V,E) be a non-empty graph of order n such that IG 6= ∅
and let S = V \ IG. Then, G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
k = min {δ(〈S〉G), n−∆(G)− 1} .
Proof. We follow a reasoning analogous to that of the proofs of Propositions 11 and 12.
First, consider a vertex v ∈ IG. We have that AG,{v} = {V \ {v}}. Now, consider a
vertex v ∈ S. In this case, AG,{v} = {NG(v), V \NG[v]} = {N〈S〉G(v), V \NG[v]}. In
consequence, we have that G satisfies (k, 1)-adjacency anonymity with
k = min
{
n− 1,min
v∈S
{
min
{
δ〈S〉G(v), n− δG(v)− 1
}}}
= min
v∈S
{
min
{
δ〈S〉G(v), n− δG(v)− 1
}}
= min
{
min
v∈S
{
δ〈S〉G(v), n− δG(v)− 1
}}
= min
{
min
v∈S
{
δ〈S〉G(v)
}
,min
v∈S
{n− δG(v)− 1}
}
= min {δ(〈S〉G), n−∆(G)− 1}
According to Propositions 11, 12 and 13, in order to enforce (k, 1)-adjacency
anonymity on a graph G, it is necessary to transform it into a graph G′ such that
the induced subgraph 〈V (G′) \ (DG′ ∪ IG′)〉G′ has minimum degree greater than or
equal to k and maximum degree smaller than or equal to n − k − 1, where n is the
order of G′. Likewise, in order to obtain a (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformation
(G = (V,E), G′ = (V ′, E ′)), it is necessary to guarantee that every v ∈ V such that
1 ≤ δG(v) < k or |V |−k−1 < δG(v) ≤ |V |−2 satisfies v /∈ V
′, or v ∈ DG′ , or v ∈ IG′ ,
or k ≤ δG′(v) ≤ |V
′| − k − 1. Based on these facts, we propose an algorithm that,
given a (k0, 1)-adjacency anonymous graph G = (V,E) and an integer k such that
k0 < k ≤
⌊
|V |−1
2
⌋
, efficiently obtains a graph G′ = (V,E ′) such that the pair (G,G′)
is a (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformation. The method works by performing a
series of edge additions and removals upon G, as outlined in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, the sets L and H contain the vertices whose degrees are, respec-
tively, smaller and greater than required for the privacy requirement to be satisfied
(without being isolated nor dominant vertices). Steps 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17,
19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30 and 33 can be efficiently performed by maintaining the
elements of V sorted by their degree and updating the ordering when necessary. The
rationale behind the loop in steps 4 to 18 is to first add as many edges as possible
between pairs of vertices from L, since every addition of this type increases the degree
of two of such vertices. When such additions are no longer possible, then we add edges
linking a vertex u ∈ L and a vertex v /∈ L whose degree is as small as possible. The
latter condition makes that the degree of vertices from H is only increased if there is
no vertex in V \H to which u can be linked. An analogous idea is applied in the loop
in steps 20 to 34 to first remove edges joining pairs of vertices from H , then edges
joining a vertex from H to other vertex (with the particularity that step 29 takes care
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Algorithm 1 Given a (k0, 1)-adjacency anonymous graph G = (V,E) and an integer
k ∈
[
k0 + 1,
⌊
|V |−1
2
⌋]
, obtain a graph G′ = (V,E ′) such that (G,G′) is a (k, 1)-
adjacency anonymous transformation.
1: E ′ ← E
2: L← {v ∈ V : 1 ≤ δG(v) < k}
3: H ← {v ∈ V : |V | − k − 1 < δG(v) ≤ |V | − 2}
4: while L 6= ∅ do
5: X ← {x ∈ L : ∃y ∈ L \ {x} s.t. (x, y) /∈ E ′}
6: if X 6= ∅ then
7: u← argmaxx∈X{δG′(x)}
8: Y ← {y ∈ L \ {u} : (u, y) /∈ E ′}
9: v ← argmaxy∈Y {δG′(y)}
10: E ′ ← E ′ ∪ {(u, v)}
11: else
12: u← argmaxx∈L{δG′(x)}
13: Y ← {y ∈ V \ L : (u, y) /∈ E ′}
14: v ← argminy∈Y {δG′(y)}
15: E ′ ← E ′ ∪ {(u, v)}
16: end if
17: L← {v ∈ L : 1 ≤ δG′(v) < k}
18: end while
19: H ← {v ∈ H : |V | − k − 1 < δG′(v) ≤ |V | − 2}
20: while H 6= ∅ do
21: X ← {x ∈ H : ∃y ∈ H \ {x} s.t. (x, y) ∈ E ′}
22: if X 6= ∅ then
23: u← argminx∈X{δG′(x)}
24: Y ← {y ∈ H \ {u} : (u, y) ∈ E ′}
25: v ← argminy∈Y {δG′(y)}
26: E ′ ← E ′ \ {(u, v)}
27: else
28: u← argminx∈H{δG′(x)}
29: Y ← {y ∈ V \ (H ∪ L) : (u, y) ∈ E ′}
30: v ← argmaxy∈Y {δG′(y)}
31: E ′ ← E ′ \ {(u, v)}
32: end if
33: H ← {v ∈ H : |V | − k − 1 < δG′(v) ≤ |V | − 2}
34: end while
35: return G′
12
of not making the degree of a vertex from L decrease again), and so on. It is worth
noting that in real-life social graphs, which are characterised by very low densities,
and for practical values of k, steps 20 to 34 are very unlikely to be executed.
Considering the number of modifications performed by the algorithm, the best
scenario is when all edge additions are done according to steps 5 to 10, and all edge
removals are done according to steps 21 to 26, as shown in the following results.
Theorem 14. Let G = (V,E) be a (k0, 1)-adjacency anonymous social graph and let
k ∈
[
k0 + 1,
⌊
|V |−1
2
⌋]
. The number t of edges added by steps 4 to 18 of Algorithm 1
satisfies 

∑
u∈V, 1≤δG(u)<k
k − δG(u)
2


≤ t ≤
∑
u∈V, 1≤δG(u)<k
k − δG(u) (2)
Proof. Let ((u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (ut, vt)), with (ui, vi) ∈ (V ×V )\E for i ∈ {1, . . . , t},
be the sequence of edges added to G by steps 4 to 18 of Algorithm 1. Let E0 = E
and Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {(ui, vi)}, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Moreover, for every i ∈ {0, . . . , t}, let
Gi = (V,Ei) and Li = {v ∈ L : 1 ≤ δGi(v) < k}.
After adding the edge (ui, vi), we have that δGi(ui) = δGi−1(ui) + 1 and δGi(vi) =
δGi−1(vi) + 1, whereas δGi(x) = δGi−1(x) for every x ∈ V − {ui, vi}.
We define the function
missing(Gi) =
∑
x∈Li
(k − δGi(x))
which specifies by how much the sum of the degrees of vertices from L needs to be
increased for (G,Gi) to be a (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transformation. Note that,
by the definition of t, we have that missing(Gt) = 0. Moreover, missing(G0) =∑
u∈V, 1≤δG(u)<k
k − δG(u). After adding the edge (ui, vi), the following situations are
possible:
1. ui, vi ∈ Li−1. In this case, since two vertices from Li−1 have their degree in-
creased by 1, we have that missing(Gi) = missing(Gi−1)− 2.
2. ui ∈ Li−1 and vi /∈ Li−1, or vice versa. Here, missing(Gi) = missing(Gi−1)−1.
With the previous definitions in mind, we will address the proof of the left-hand in-
equality in Equation 2. To that end, we will assume, for the purpose of contradiction,
that
t <
⌈∑
u∈V, 1≤δG(u)<k
k − δG(u)
2
⌉
=
⌈
missing(G0)
2
⌉
.
If missing(G0) is even, we have that t <
missing(G0)
2
. Given that, in the best case
scenario, situation 1 above occurs at every iteration of the algorithm, we have
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missing(Gt) ≥ missing(G0)− 2t
> missing(G0)− 2 ·
missing(G0)
2
= 0
which is a contradiction.
In a similar manner, if missing(G0) is odd, we have that t <
missing(G0)+1
2
. Here,
in the best case scenario, situation 1 above occurs in every iteration, except one, so
missing(Gt) ≥ missing(G0)− 2(t− 1)− 1
> missing(G0)− 2
(
missing(G0)+1
2
− 1
)
− 1
= 0
which is also a contradiction. Thus, we can conclude that
t ≥
⌈∑
u∈V, 1≤δG(u)<k
k − δG(u)
2
⌉
.
The right-hand inequality in Equation 2 is trivial, given that at least one vertex
has its degree increased by 1 at every iteration. The proof is thus complete.
The lower and upper bounds provided in Theorem 14 are tight, as exemplified in
Figures 4.a) and 4.b), respectively.
a) b)
Figure 4: Two examples where the number of edges added by steps 4 to 18 of Algo-
rithm 1 (for k = 2) reaches the (a) lower and (b) upper bounds of the inequalities in
Equation 2. In both cases, dashed lines indicate the edges added by the algorithm.
The next result describes the number t′ of edges removed by steps 20 to 34 of
Algorithm 1.
Theorem 15. Let G = (V,E) be a (k0, 1)-adjacency anonymous social graph and let
k ∈
[
k0 + 1,
⌊
|V |−1
2
⌋]
. Let Gt be the graph obtained from G after executing steps 4
to 18 of Algorithm 1. The number t′ of edges removed by steps 20 to 34 of Algorithm 1
satisfies
t′ ≥


∑
u∈V, |V |−k−1<δG(u)≤|V |−2
[k − (|V | − δGt(u)− 1)]
2


(3)
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and
t′ ≤
∑
u∈V, |V |−k−1<δG(u)≤|V |−2
[k − (|V | − δGt(u)− 1)] (4)
Proof. We will follow a reasoning analogous to the one applied in the proof of The-
orem 14. Let ((u1, v1), (u2, v2), . . . , (ut′, vt′)), with (ui, vi) ∈ Et = E(Gt) for i ∈
{1, . . . , t′}, be the sequence of edges removed fromGt by steps 20 to 34 of Algorithm 1.
Let Et+i = Et+i−1 \ {(ui, vi)}, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t
′}. Moreover, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , t′},
let Gt+i = (V,Et+i) and Hi = {v ∈ H : |V | − k − 1 < δGt+i(v) ≤ |V | − 2}.
After removing the edge (ui, vi), we have that δGt+i(ui) = δGt+i−1(ui) − 1 and
δGt+i(vi) = δGt+i−1(vi)− 1, whereas δGt+i(x) = δGt−i−1(x) for every x ∈ V − {ui, vi}.
Now we introduce the function
excess(Gt+i) =
∑
x∈Hi
[
k − (|V | − δGt+i(x)− 1)
]
.
In a manner analogous to the proof of Theorem 14, we have that by definition
excess(Gt+t′) = 0 and excess(Gt) =
∑
u∈V, |V |−k−1<δG(u)<|V |−2
[k − (|V | − δG(u)− 1)].
Additionally, after removing the edge (ui, vi), the following situations are possible:
1. ui, vi ∈ Hi−1. In this case, since two vertices from Hi−1 have their degree
decreased by 1, we have that excess(Gt+i) = excess(Gt+i−1)− 2.
2. ui ∈ Hi−1 and vi /∈ Hi−1, or vice versa. Here, excess(Gt+i) = excess(Gt+i−1)−1.
Now, to address the proof of the inequality in Equation 3, we assume, for the
purpose of contradiction, that
t′ <


∑
u∈V, |V |−k−1<δG(u)≤|V |−2
[k − (|V | − δGt(u)− 1)]
2


=
⌈
excess(Gt)
2
⌉
.
In consequence, if excess(Gt) is even, we have
excess(Gt+t′) ≥ excess(Gt)− 2t
′
> excess(Gt)− 2 ·
excess(Gt)
2
= 0
which is a contradiction, whereas in the case that excess(Gt) is odd we have
excess(Gt+t′) ≥ excess(Gt)− 2(t
′ − 1)− 1
> excess(Gt)− 2
(
excess(Gt)+1
2
− 1
)
− 1
= 0
which is also a contradiction, so we can conclude that Equation 3 holds. As in
Theorem 14, the upper bound (Equation 4) is trivial.
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4 (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations
In Algorithm 1, the fact that a vertex v satisfies v ∈ L means that the equivalence
class composed by the vertices having adjacency representation (1) with respect to
the set {v} in the original graph G is not empty and its cardinality is smaller than k.
Likewise, the fact that v ∈ H means that the equivalence class composed by the
vertices having adjacency representation (2) with respect to the set {v} in G is not
empty and its cardinality is smaller than k. To a limited extent, a strategy similar
to the one applied in Algorithm 1 can be used to obtain (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous
transformations with ℓ > 1. For example, for ℓ = 2, in addition to the sets L,H ⊂
V (G), we would consider the sets P11, P12, P21, P22 ⊆ V (G) × V (G), where (u, v) ∈
Pij, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, means that the the equivalence class composed by the vertices
having adjacency representation (i, j) with respect to (u, v) in G is not empty and
its cardinality is smaller than k. Thus, the algorithm would work by executing the
necessary edge set editions to increase the cardinalities of these equivalence classes
or, alternatively, to empty them. However, it is impractical to use this philosophy
in the general case, as it entails designing a different, highly casuistic algorithm for
every different value of ℓ.
For the general case, we have devised a greedy edge-addition-based method that,
for small values of ℓ, allows to obtain (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations.
Given a graph G = (V,E), the method starts by computing all 1-adjacency antire-
solving sets of G of cardinality at most ℓ. Then, edges are iteratively added until
obtaining a graph G′ = (V,E ∪E ′) such that (G,G′) is a (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous
transformation. The critical aspect of the proposed framework is how to determine
an appropriate order for adding edges.
In order to describe the proposed method, we will first introduce the following
results, which characterise the sets of edges whose addition to a graph G may modify
the set of 1-adjacency antiresolving sets. In what follows, we will use the notation SG,ℓ
for the set of 1-adjacency antiresolving sets of a graph G having cardinality smaller
than or equal to ℓ.
Remark 16. Let G = (V,E) be a social graph, u, v ∈ V a pair of vertices of G
such that (u, v) /∈ E, and G′ = (V,E ∪ {(u, v)}). If, for every S ∈ SG,ℓ, either
S ∩ {u, v} = {u, v} or S ∩ {u, v} = ∅, then SG,ℓ \ SG′,ℓ = SG,ℓ.
Proof. The result follows directly from the fact that, for every S ∈ SG,ℓ and every
x ∈ V \ S, we have that aG(x | S) = aG′(x | S), so S ∈ SG′,ℓ.
Algorithm 2 describes the edge-addition method. First, we use Remark 16 to
discard candidate vertex pairs (u, v) that are known not to cause any 1-adjacency an-
tiresolving set of the current graph G = (V,E) to become a k-adjacency antiresolving
set of G′ = (V,E ∪ {(u, v)}) with k > 1. Then, every remaining candidate pair (u, v)
is scored as follows:
score((u, v)) = |{S : S ∈ SG,ℓ, u ∈ S, [v]
G
S = {v}}|.
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where [v]GS represents the equivalence class of v in AG,S. In other words, we consider
the number of times the candidate pair would modify the fingerprint of a uniquely
identifiable vertex with respect to a 1-adjacency antiresolving set of G. The intuition
behind this heuristics is that the larger the number of times that the pair (u, v)
is found in this situation, the larger the likelihood that adding the edge (u, v) will
result in making some vertex set stop being 1-adjacency antiresolving. At every
iteration, the current perturbed graph G′ = (V,E ′) is transformed into the graph
G′′ = (V,E ′ ∪ {(u, v)}), where (u, v) is the best-scored candidate addition satisfying
(SG′′,ℓ \ SG′,ℓ) ∩ SG,ℓ = ∅.
Algorithm 2 Given a graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer ℓ ≥ 2, obtain a graph
G′ = (V,E ′) such that (G,G′) is a (2, ℓ)-anonymous transformation.
1: C ← ∅
2: Compute SG,ℓ
3: C ← ∅
4: for (u, v) ∈ (V × V ) \ E do
5: for S ∈ SG,ℓ do
6: if |S ∩ (u, v)| = 1 then
7: C ← C ∪ {(u, v)}
8: break
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: Decrementally sort C by score((u, v)) = |{S : S ∈ SG,ℓ, u ∈ S, [v]
G
S = {v}}|
13: t← 0
14: E0 ← E
15: while SG,ℓ \ SGt,ℓ 6= ∅ do
16: (u, v) = argmaxscore(u,v){(u, v) ∈ C : (S(V,Et∪{(u,v)}),ℓ \ SGt,ℓ) ∩ SG,ℓ = ∅}
17: Et+1 ← Et ∪ {(u, v)}
18: C ← C \ {(u, v)}
19: t← t+ 1
20: end while
21: return Gt
The asymptotic time complexity of Algorithm 2 is dominated by the computation
and traversals of SG,ℓ, which is O(2
n) in the general case. However, for small values
of ℓ, these computations can be done in O(nℓ) time. As we discussed before, active
adversaries can only insert a limited amount of sybil nodes in the network without
being detected, so the capacity of protecting the graph against such adversaries results
in an important privacy increase. As an aid to speed-up the algorithm, the following
result shows how the number of verifications to perform in evaluating the condition
at step 16 can be largely reduced.
Theorem 17. Let G = (V,E) be a social graph, u, v ∈ V a pair of vertices of G such
that (u, v) /∈ E, and G′ = (V,E ∪ {(u, v)}). Let S ⊆ V such that it is a k-adjacency
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antiresolving set of G, with k ≥ 2, and a 1-adjacency antiresolving set of G′. If there
exists w ∈ S such that dG(u, w) > 2 and dG(v, w) > 2, then for every x ∈ V \ S such
that [x]G
′
S = {x} it holds that [x]
G′
S\{w} = {x} and |[x]
G
S\{w}| > 1.
Proof. Consider a graph G = (V,E), a pair of vertices u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) /∈ E
and a set S ⊆ V satisfying the premises of Theorem 17. Also consider a vertex w ∈ S
such that dG(u, w) > 2 and dG(v, w) > 2 and a vertex x ∈ V \S such that [x]
G′
S = {x}.
By the definition of S we have that |[x]GS | > 1, so there exists y ∈ V \ (S ∪ {x}) such
that aG(x| S) = aG(y| S) and aG′(x| S) 6= aG′(y| S). Suppose, for the purpose of
contradiction, that aG′(w, x) 6= aG′(w, y). Then, since w 6= u and w 6= v, we have that
aG(w, x) 6= aG(w, y), which contradicts the fact that aG(x| S) = aG(y| S). Therefore,
we have that aG′(w, x) = aG′(w, y), which implies that aG(x| S\{w}) = aG(y| S\{w})
and aG′(x| S \ {w}) 6= aG′(y| S \ {w}). Since the only difference between G and G
′
is the addition of the edge (u, v), we conclude that either x = u and v ∈ S, or vice
versa. For the remainder of this proof, we will assume x = u and v ∈ S without loss
of generality.
We will now proceed by reduction to absurdity. To that end, we will assume that
|[x]G
′
S\{w}| > 1 or [x]
G
S\{w} = {x}. It is simple to see that [x]
G
S\{w} = {x} contradicts
the fact that S is a k-adjacency antiresolving set of G with k ≥ 2. Therefore, in what
follows we will focus on the assumption that |[x]G
′
S\{w}| > 1. In this case, there exists
y ∈ V \ (S ∪ {x}) such that aG′(x| S \ {w}) = aG′(y| S \ {w}). Since [x]
G′
S = {x}, we
have that aG′(w, x) 6= aG′(w, y). Moreover, since (w, x) 6= (u, v) and (w, y) 6= (u, v),
we have that aG(w, x) = aG′(w, x) and aG(w, y) = aG′(w, y). Thus, it holds that
aG′(w, x) 6= aG′(w, y) =⇒ aG(w, x) 6= aG(w, y), which entails
(w ∼
G
x ∧ w ≁
G
y) ∨ (w ≁
G
x ∧ w ∼
G
y)
Since x = u, we have that w ≁
G
x, because dG(u, w) > 2, so w ∼G y. Moreover, since
u ∼
G′
v and aG′(v, x) = aG′(v, y), then v ∼G y, which implies dG(w, v) = 2, again a
contradiction. This concludes the proof.
According to Theorem 17, when verifying if the addition of an edge (u, v) causes
some k-adjacency antiresolving set (with k ≥ 2) of Gt to become a 1-adjacency
antiresolving set of G′t = (V (Gt), E(Gt) ∪ {(u, v)}), it suffices to analyse those sets
S ∈ SGt,ℓ such that some w ∈ S satisfies dGt(u, w) ≤ 2 or dGt(v, w) ≤ 2.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have re-visited the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymity, which quantifies the
privacy level of a social graph in the presence of active adversaries. Firstly, we have
introduced the notion of (k, ℓ)-anonymous transformations, which allow to reduce
the amount of perturbation needed to protect a social graph from an active attack.
Secondly, we have critically assessed the assumptions posed by (k, ℓ)-anonymity on
the adversary capabilities. Judging that it is unrealistic to assume that an adversary
will be able to control all distances between a set of sybil nodes and every other
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vertex of the social graph, we introduced a new privacy property: (k, ℓ)-adjacency
anonymity, which accounts for adversaries who control the connection patterns with
the neighbours of the sybil nodes. Finally, combining the two previous ideas, we have
introduced (k, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous transformations, which are able to protect a
social graph from active adversaries levaraging up to ℓ sybil nodes and constructing
fingerprints based on the connection patterns between victims and sybil nodes. We
proposed two algorithms: one for obtaining (k, 1)-adjacency anonymous transforma-
tions for arbitrary values of k, and another for obtaining (2, ℓ)-adjacency anonymous
transformations for small values of ℓ. The first algorithm is efficient and the number of
changes introduced in the graph is bounded. On the other hand, there is still room for
improvement in the second method, especially concerning the order in which graph
perturbations are applied. We are currently using a greedy heuristic to guide the
edge-addition process. We will evaluate the convenience of this heuristic, and explore
the use of meta-heuristics such as genetic algorithms and ant-colony optimisation.
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